Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry

and Senator Lugar and members of the committee.

It is a great pleasure to be back and, indeed, an honor and privilege

for me to be asked today to testify on this most important

issue, as you have described it. I thank you for your invitation.

It is also an honor and a privilege for me to join General Cartwright

and Karim Sadjadpour, both of whom I admire and respect

and both of whom I believe will have very important contributions

as well to make.

My hope is to use my prepared testimony as a basis to address

three issues regarding Iran and the United States, which I believe

are responsive to a number of points in your opening statements.

First, what do we know about Iran’s nuclear program and its evolution?

Second, what is the current diplomatic situation, and what

might we expect? And third, what options are available to us and

my recommendations in that regard.

My career has been in diplomacy. I will, therefore, focus my time

and attention to that aspect of the subject.

Let me begin by saying that the Iran nuclear program is not a

new device. It began under the Shah and, indeed, we had concerns

that under the Shah the program was much broader in its future

intent than a civil nuclear program.

When the revolution came in 1979, that program was terminated

by the incoming government. After the attack of Iraq on Iran and

the long 8-year war, Iran showed new interest in a program.

Among other things, it purchased a civil power reactor from Germany,

the delivery and construction of which was shut off by the

United States.

It then went to the Russians, who made a deal consistent with

proliferation that the fuel would be provided by Russia and then

Russia would take back the spent fuel to do everything possible to

assure there would be no plutonium route to a bomb.

Subsequent to that, Iran got very interested in enrichment, seeking,

as it said, to provide itself with the possibility of assuring its

own future needs, even though it had a one-reactor program where

the fuel was provided by Russia.

Iran now has something on the order of 6,000 to 9,000 centrifuges,

enriching in the main to the 3.5 percent low-enriched uranium

requirement for civil power reactors. It has an additional

small set of centrifuges enriching to 20 percent in order to provide,

in their view, the necessary fuel for a research reactor originally

provided by the United States, which makes medical isotopes.

The upgrading of Iranian enrichment capability is worrying, as

well as the accumulation of a large amount of low-enriched uranium,

which, were there to be a breakout effort, would probably be

detected but would certainly give them something of a head start.

And there are various estimates about how long it would take.

The conclusion that I reach—but I believe it is a conclusion reflected

by a number of others, including the United States Government,

Israel, and, indeed, Iranian friends—is that Iran is attempt-

ing to put itself in a position to know enough about technology and

have enough equipment that were it to make a decision to make

a nuclear weapon, it would be able to do so.

I think the other important point is that the U.S. intelligence

judgments recently reaffirmed by General Clapper seem to continue

to indicate that Iran has not made a decision to make a

nuclear weapon.

Let me now turn to diplomacy. In recent days, diplomacy has

quickened in terms of its possibilities. Some weeks ago, Iran invited

the P5+1, the European three—Britain, France, Germany—

Russia, China, and the United States, to resume negotiations on its

nuclear program. It did so in a fairly straightforward way compared

to past efforts.

Recently, the P5+1 has responded positively, and as you know,

overnight the information was published that the talks will take

place in Istanbul on April 14. Leading into the talks, there have

been two or three interesting developments that I think are worth

looking at in terms of trying to read the tea leaves.

Not only was there the invitation to the talks, there was more

Iranian cooperation, I understand, with the IAEA and efforts to

clear up the past. More significantly, the famous fatwa in Iran

against making nuclear weapons was reissued by the Supreme

Leader in terms that for the first time in my knowledge actually

mentioned nuclear weapons.

And the Supreme Leader took notice in his blog site, whatever

that may be, of the President’s recent speech to AIPAC and did so

positively. These may or may not be significant. We will have to

wait and see.

It is also true that the President in his speech to AIPAC made

something of a serious point, and I am grateful for it, that diplomacy

was a choice for him to move ahead for the future. That

means we are on the verge of new talks.

Past talks have suffered, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,

because they have been a series of one-night stands. Meetings

that took place over 1 day, where one side or the other, either

Iran or the United States, had a proposal, and the other side

rejected it. They went away and then spent another 6 to 8 months

negotiating a resumption of talks.

Happily, Catherine Ashton, who speaks for the P5+1 in recent

days, has said the intention on our side, if I can call it that, is to

open the door to a negotiating process which lasts more than 1 day

and, hopefully, will have some continuation to address not only

what issues are not acceptable, but how they might be made

acceptable through a negotiating process. That is important.

Let me now briefly run through the options that I feel are out

there for us and for Iran for the future. The first might be a throwaway

option, but it is not an insignificant option to some. That is

the question of whether we just sit back and let Iran proliferate.

Perhaps that may be a form of containment. Perhaps it is not.

I feel it is not a good option. It puts down the tools that we have

now put ourselves in place to use through sanctions to assist in

opening to diplomacy. It condemns us to perhaps a stark choice

between permitting proliferation to take place and using military

force.

Not only that, further proliferation in the region I think is a significant

possibility if Iran proliferates. The more proliferation we

have, the more chance there is for the use of a weapon either

through accident, miscalculation, or design. That is not the world

we want for us or for the future, and I would say that others in

the region, including Iran, need to think very carefully about that.

The second option is military force. There have been volumes

written on this. My sense is, without going into all the details, that

the risks that we and others would take, including Israel, are far

more significant than the advantages we might achieve. And the

general assumption is that an advantage of setting back the program

for several years would be a useful justification.

I don’t agree with that. I think that it is, in my view, a seriously

flawed approach, particularly now when we haven’t exhausted the

other options, including diplomacy.

I would only say two or three things about the military option.

It has a very high propensity, in my view, of driving Iran into the

direction of openly declaring and deciding, which it has not yet

done, according to our intelligence, to make a nuclear weapon

seemingly to defend itself under what might look to them and

others to be an unprovoked attack.

Iran has great possibilities for asymmetrical reactions, including

against Israel through Hezbollah and Hamas, who have accumulated

a large number of missiles. And we can go on from there, including

the potential vulnerabilities of Americans overseas to

asymmetrical reposts and the fact that were that to happen, one

option for us would be a larger, more engaged, more significant allout

attack on Iran to try to stop such attacks against Americans.

It is a series of potential escalatory possibilities that puts us

deep in the potential for another land war in Asia, something I

think that we have spent the last number of years trying to get out

of.

The next to the last option is sanctions. You and others have described

it. I believe, quite frankly and very succinctly, that sanctions

without an open door to a process to exploit the value of those

sanctions in the diplomatic arena is a mistake. Expecting, in fact,

that through the escalation of sanctions, Iran will, like the Marxist

famous ripe plum, drop into our laps—that Iran will accept any

particular alternative we have in mind—is certainly in the dream

world rather than reality.

But I do very much believe that sanctions—and there is a whole

panoply of these—can be very helpful in moving us into a diplomatic

direction. And then that raises the question of diplomacy.

Now let me say just two or three things again about the importance

of diplomacy. And hopefully, you will want to explore some

of this as we go ahead.

Diplomacy, in my view, is a question of timing. Timing is very

significant. Timing ought to take advantage of sanctions, but it

ought to move the process when seemingly the other side, through

its invitation, is ready.

It also ought to enjoy the opportunity to move before we have

exhausted all of our sanctions because that is throwing away our

future leverage to affect the outcome of diplomacy if we, in fact,

continue to wait. We don’t have an unlimited time, but we have

some time for diplomacy to work.

The second question is how should we start? Very frankly there

is on the table already an Iranian proposal which is very simple,

but potentially a good starting place. That proposal would, in effect,

commit Iran to cease enriching uranium to 20 percent if we, on our

side of the fence, the P5+1, were prepared to help them obtain the

fuel for the research reactor that makes medical isotopes.

To me, this is a good starting place. It is a good starting place

for a number of reasons. It is a proposal on the table. It is a simple

proposal, and it is one that could be accomplished at coming meetings

at Istanbul, in my judgment.

It might be followed by other steps and stages. And I want to say

two things here about those. A follow-on step that would be germane

and relevant would, in effect, be to take the original Iranian

proposal, once agreed, and turn it into a cap on enrichment in Iran

at 5 percent, which basically accommodates their stated intention

to have fuel for future nuclear reactors but, on the other hand,

keeps them from escalating enrichment up the line toward weapons

grade.

The second piece would be to take the accumulated 20 percent

material which they have, something around 100 kilograms, and

use that to be turned over in exchange for the turnover to them

of the fabricated fuel elements to make the reactor function. And

perhaps this deal at that stage could be enriched by a freeze, not

a cessation, but a freeze, on several of the important sanctions—

those perhaps on the Central Bank of Iran and those that relate

to a stop in European purchases of crude oil.

Beyond that, I will say only that other steps and stages might

take advantage of two very important objectives that are significant

for Iran. One is to do everything we can to strengthen and

improve and, indeed, embed International Atomic Energy Agency

monitoring in Iran.

It is the one way we have to demonstrate and, indeed, control an

Iranian program at the time which they may seek, either clandestinely

or otherwise, to achieve a breakout. In regard to that, for a

long time, I have personally advocated that we then should be willing

to put on the table a positive response to Iran’s interest in

enriching material for civil purposes only—that is, below the 5 percent

threshold.

And I would add to that that we should continue to insist that

an accumulation of such material be under safeguards and perhaps

moved out of Iran if it is above any current need which they have.

Finally, I think an endgame for diplomacy would, importantly,

have four elements. A full commitment on the part of Iran to stay

completely away from bombmaking, if I can put it that way. Second,

a full inspection system that would have the maximum capability

both to control and deter that. In return, permission for Iran

to enrich below the threshold of 5 percent and, second, the gradual

removal of sanctions on Iran.

One final point, Mr. Chairman. There are other issues nonnuclear,

as you and Senator Lugar have pointed out, between the

United States, the Western countries, and Iran. They need to be

addressed, perhaps outside of the nuclear framework. But they can

help to improve relationships and, indeed, build on early progress,

which I hope will be achieved in the nuclear area.

They relate to the futures of countries like Afghanistan and Iraq,

where we share some common interests, but they also relate to

questions of Iranian preoccupation with drugs and, indeed, our preoccupation

with Iranian support for terrorism, for violations of

human rights, and for Iranian objections to and steps taken in the

past against the Middle East peace process.

We have an opportunity now, Mr. Chairman, to move ahead. Not

too long ago, an Iranian friend of mine who had played an important

role in Iranian foreign policy over the years told me, ‘‘The historical

record shows that every time we have been ready, you have

not been. And every time you have been ready, we have not been.’’

Maybe we can emerge from that position of the past to begin with

some small things that we can use to find a way to pull the curves

of mutual interest together rather than to have them continue to

bend apart.

Thank you very much.

Senator, it is a very interesting and important

point. First, I begin with the notion that I have clearly no

objection and, indeed, some reason to support the idea that the people

of Iran should know much more clearly what is going on.

I went there as a tourist in 2004, and I was amazed at the number

of people who came up to me on the street as an apparent foreigner

and said, ‘‘Why? What are the real problems between the

U.S. and Iran?’’ They were totally isolated. And I think that is a

significant point.

Second, it would help to reinforce a point that I would like to differ

just a little bit from Karim on, that the Supreme Leader is so

implacably dedicated against any deal, so frightened of any deal

that he won’t come. I think that we only have to look back to 2002

when my good friend, Jim Dobbins, was negotiating, with the help

of Iran, the new Government for Afghanistan.

And at the end of that, he famously writes in his book he got a

long message from Iran saying we would now like to explore other

options for negotiations with the United States. He brought it back,

and it died in the inbox somewhere, or it died in somebody’s circular

file, or it died with somebody’s ideology, whatever it was. But

it didn’t get anywhere.

So my sense is, from Iranian friends who have worked with the

Supreme Leader, that he is suspicious. He is, indeed, as Karim

said so correctly, upset by the notion that the only U.S. policy is

really this regime change policy and that in the end, it will do him in.

But nevertheless, throughout the period, he apparently has said

you guys who want to deal with America are wrong and you won’t

succeed, and they will end up confirming that to you. But go ahead

and try. And we have a number of cases where they went ahead

and tried, a number of cases where it didn’t succeed. Not, I think,

entirely all on the part of Iran, although they certainly played a

significant role in making the negotiations very difficult.

So my hope is, to get back to your original question, that with

more enlightenment on the part of the people of Iran they can support

a negotiating process that will give them confidence that, in

effect, with good behavior on Iran’s part, with an ability to come

together on these issues, there will be a much better option than

either bombing or continued unlimited repression of one kind or

another, which has its own consequences.

Thank you, Senator.

I think it is the most important question. My own sense, and I

spoke briefly about this in my presentation, is that we ought to

take a proposal they put on the table, which I believe happens to

be in our interest, which is that they would stop producing mate-

rial at 20 percent. Which at least in the physics of enrichment is

a long way up the line, a lot further than 3.5 percent.

And in return, we would provide the fuel elements to continue

to allow them to operate a reactor that makes medical isotopes, as

civilian as you can get. And it seems to me that is a test case, and

we ought to be able to try to be creative and move ahead with that

test case.

The second piece is, overall, their proposals have been they

would like to run a civilian program. We have plenty of good reasons

for believing that in the past they have flirted with nuclear

weapons and done things that have taken them out of the purely

civil. But we also know from our own intelligence that in 2003,

apparently for reasons that we don’t know, but we can imagine,

they stopped that bomb program.

And so, we ought to take them to a position to do everything we

can to put that so solidly in concrete they cannot move beyond it

on the one hand and put in place the kind of inspection mechanisms,

broaden the IAEA mandate, work with the IAEA to do that.

Buttress that with our own sources of information so that, in

fact, we create as much of a deterrent as we can against their getting

away from the firewall that I talked about earlier, that we

would hopefully put in place through negotiations.

Now, look, nobody knows whether negotiations will succeed or

not. I don’t share Karim’s notion that the situation is so bad that

it is almost feckless to try. And he and I both agree, and he said

so here, that we ought to try.

Indeed, if we are contemplating other options like the use of

force, I certainly think we ought to exhaust diplomacy before we

get there. We have been there before, Senator, as you know, and

it hasn’t treated us or the region or, indeed, others very well to

jump over those particular possibilities, if I can phrase them that

way.

Sure. I think that we would all agree

that Iran has a very intensive way of negotiating. It may have

learned, unfortunately, lessons from North Korea that has its own

way. I suppose that if you have ever had the experience of raising

children to the age of 2 years, you get some sense of how and in

what way that process operates at a perhaps slightly more elemental

level of psychology.

They are extremely hard bargainers. They have grown up, after

all, in a society where bargaining is a science, not just an art form.

And so, we have those questions already.

They may have internal differences. They may seek over a period

of time, as I believe they did when they first agreed to the arrangement

in October 2009, that, in fact, they would turn over to us

1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in return for the fuel elements

I am now advocating we provide for the 20-percent material.

But nevertheless, that failed. It failed in part because I believe

there was serious internal disagreement. The Supreme Leader did

not really want President Ahmadinejad to claim some credit for

this. He didn’t trust that. He was concerned.

So we have had problems on both sides in being able, if I could

put it that way, to manage the negotiating process.

And I, without digressing too much, see, in fact, arrangements

here on the Hill which I deeply am opposed to to try to impose restrictions

on the President with respect to what he can negotiate,

rather than to follow the normal rule in which you are hopefully

fully consulted but then have the opportunity to up-or-down

approve an agreement that the executive branch brings to you as

a result of our constitutional and traditional processes in that regard.

I couldn’t know of a wiser statement.

Senator, that is an offer that I think is

only a few months old, and that may be in terms of the time scale

of Iran an old offer. But I think that it has been on the table not

so long that it would be dead.

Now there are some considerations here that we need to keep in

mind. The Iranians have produced one fuel element at 20 percent,

which they are now testing in the reactor. My friends who are

much more expert than I in this say that no one, even the Iranians,

would be sufficiently confident enough without a long test of that

one fuel element to feel they have now achieved independence with

respect to the operation of that reactor. So I think the dependency

piece is still there.

There are also, obviously, other important things we can do.

They had talked about building three or four more such reactors

to make medical isotopes. My own view is that there is probably

technology that would be available that could make the one reactor

they have much more efficient at producing medical isotopes.

So there are things here that I think we can turn into win/win,

even if, in fact, the basic proposal might be complexified, if I could

put it that way, by the Iranian negotiating reaction. And we need

to think down the road about that.

Nevertheless, it is still their proposal. It is giving them what

they have asked for, and I believe in that sense, it is very much

in the U.S. interests. I believe it is in Israel’s interest not to have

any more 20-percent material, not to have any more material above

3.5 percent produced as a place to start. There are gains in both

directions.

Senator, if you have gained the impression

that I was against the sanctions, that is not the impression

I intended to leave. I intended to say that it is extremely important

we use the sanctions in a creative way to move toward diplomacy,

and I think that has been the general view of the three of us here.

Yes. I think that we have just had a discussion

with one of your members about regime change, does that

have an effect? Some may argue that pressures that look like regime

change may have a positive effect in moving Iran toward a

deal. Others may argue, as I think Mr. Sadjadpour, although he is

best able to speak for himself, that this is having a negative reaction

on the Supreme Leader’s willingness to make a decision.

We have had lots of discussion of all options on the table. There

is only one reason for me to believe that all options should be on

the table because it has initially and very importantly a potentially

positive effect on Iran’s willingness to look at a negotiating option,

and we have discussed some of that in detail. So it isn’t sanctions

alone, but the panoply of efforts.

We need to be careful, however, in calculating that, that as we

move with those efforts, we do not drive the Iranians in a direction

that Mr. Sadjadpour signaled that we would not wish to see them

go about trying to find a solution to this problem and, hopefully,

a solution to this problem short of what I consider to be the highly

risky, very low advantage military option.

I addressed that in my opening remarks,

Senator, and I think it is very clear that, in effect, we have had

this renewal of sudden interest on the part of a number of states

in the region, United Arab Emirates for one, and others in ‘‘a civil

nuclear program.’’

Many of us have felt for years that if Iran proliferates, there will

be enormous pressure on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United

Arab Emirates, and others to move in that direction. And indeed,

there are some feelings they have already thought well enough

about that to be able to perhaps make that kind of move.

And that kind of proliferation adds significantly to the instability

that is at the essence of the nonproliferation argument. The more

people who have these, the more chance you have for use by accident,

miscalculation, or even design. The franchise process may be

there, although I myself believe very strongly that everyone who

gets a weapon’s first instinct is to make sure nobody else gets it.

And their second instinct is to wonder what are they really going

to use this thing for? And to some extent, I think that is an argument

against putting weapons out to franchisees, who are not

McDonald’s employees but are likely in their own way, once they

have one, unless you have some kind of remote control permissive

action link to control use of that weapon, going to use it for their

own purposes. So franchising is not an absolutely certainly controlled

process, and we need to be concerned about proliferation on

its own to other nation states as well as the franchise problem.

And my sense is that proliferation in the region is going to be

self-stimulating. If you just look at the history, India says it got a

weapon because China had a weapon. Pakistan said it had to get

a weapon because India had a weapon, and we see others going on.

So this chain is one that we have worked hard to try to break,

and in a number of cases, we have been successful. It has not been

a totally feckless proposition.

You look at South Africa. You could look at the potential for

South Korea in the past, for Taiwan in the past, and so on. And

I think we obviously need to keep it up. And so, strongly, strongly,

my view is we must stop proliferation in Iran.

I share your concerns. I believe that

were you to get a briefing, you would not believe that there is such

a rapid expansion of centrifuges, but any expansion concerns me.

My own——

OK.

I assumed you were. In any event, you

might want to ask that question again with respect to the pace and

speed.

The next question that I think we have to address is are the centrifuges

solely devoted to a program which our Intelligence Committee,

at least as of the last time I heard, believes is not a weapons

program. I don’t know the answer to that.

They claim they would like to have the material so that the reactor

that they have and the reactors they might buy in the future,

they can assure there will be fuel for that.

And I——

Let me, if I may, please answer that?

And then I will get into the dialogue.

The fatwa is more than just the isolated musings of an addled

cleric. But you will have to get experts on Shiism to talk to you

about it. I have looked into it. I believe it could be reversed. I believe

it could be rapidly reversed were they attacked.

Finally, I would say we need to find a way, in my view, to get

the various pieces of this program under control, regardless of what

we may say or believe about where they are going in the future,

and that is, in my view, the purpose of negotiations.

And thank you for your patience, and I am ready for any other

question you have got.

I do, and I have a fundamental question

about why they would need enrichment at all if they haven’t

bought the reactors and they have to go to Russia for the reactors.

And Russia seemingly will not provide the reactors without the fuel

and the spent fuel.

These all worry me, and they are all very much part of my continuing

concern about what we are engaged in here. My hope is

that we can start a process that can get at these, but I mean, I

believe that it is incumbent upon us to do everything we can to

make that process work.

But I can’t tell you any more than anybody else at this table can

tell you there is any guarantee that it will work.

Yes, sir. I merely said it was a subject

in which Iran would like, I believe, to talk to us about seeing, in

fact, whether more active action could be taken, and I think that

they specifically refer to Afghanistan. They have made comments,

and I don’t think there are any reasons to doubt these, there may

be that they have lost over 3,000 people in the long war against

drugs moving across their border from Afghanistan.

And we have had a considerable problem in Afghanistan, as you

know. Our problem has been——

The lack of an ability to

provide a serious and immediate or at least fast-acting alternative

to the cultivation of drugs that doesn’t at the same time produce

a significant recruiting tool for the Taliban. And as we are now

postured, we are working on long-term solutions. While at the

same time, drugs continue to produce significant amount of income,

which I cannot believe stays away from funding Taliban interests

in Afghanistan.

So it is a part of the problem. And to some extent, they see a

common interest in both our parts, but I have been in Russia and

I have talked to Iranians, and they both say why aren’t you, now

that you are, you know, in a big position in Afghanistan, doing

more to stop the drug cultivation which, in some ways, feeds the

problem monetarily.

And our answer has to be, well, we are going to have to do everything

we can. But we cannot feed the problem in terms of producing

more new fighters in the hands of the Taliban if we can possibly

avoid that. And this has been a very tough decision, one that

I am troubled by, but I wish I could tell you I knew a fast-acting

and easy solution to deal with it.

I might go ahead, and I would certainly

defer to General

Cartwright and all of the military pieces. My

sense is that the best bright redline I could come up with at the

moment is a decision to make a nuclear weapon. We may or may

not know about it immediately.

If that decision is to use what has already been produced in the

way of, say, low-enriched uranium as the basis for upgrading, then

we will know about it because all of that material and the operational

system that supports it is under IAEA control—seals and

visits and cameras.

If the decision is to develop a completely black program from

zero, with no relationship to the existing program except for perhaps

the passage of information, and even that would open it up

to some transparency, then I think it would take a quite long time

to produce. If there is intercommunication, if I could put it,

between the black program and the existing program, then there

are obviously chances of detection, but not perfect.

But my feeling is that is a much better redline than the redline

of nuclear capability, which, as we know, floats around and is

something the Israelis are concerned about because they are feeling

that they have perhaps limited military capability with respect to

some underground and other installations.

My feeling is that nuclear capability already exists. If you look

around the world, most people who engage in one way at all with

things like enrichment and reprocessing have ‘‘nuclear capability.’’

The nuclear capability is dual purpose, as we all know. There are

reasons why we call it sensitive technology and why we have struggled

for years to try, despite the freedom to use it in the Nonproliferation

Treaty, to bring it under some more control.

And indeed, my own view is that it would be well worthwhile for

us to look at even having the declared nuclear states put their sensitive

facilities under much more strict international control and

perhaps multinational management as a way to get at this fundamental

problem. But it is a very fuzzy area.

Does reading a book that gives you some of the critical information

about this, which is in public, entitle you to be in the area of

nuclear capability and, therefore, subject to bombing by somebody

who doesn’t trust you or doesn’t like your program? So we see all

of that. And I don’t know that I have a good bright redline to give

you under nuclear capability.

You could begin to think about, at least on one side, the use of

research to develop tools that have nothing to do with civil nuclear

power but have to do with weapons development. And those have

been the IAEA concerns about possible military developments in

Iran, including such things as ignition systems for nuclear weapons

and the explosive systems that are used, in effect, to create a

fission reaction in nuclear weapons, which are quite different.

And we have seen signs, as the IAEA has, of those before 2003

in Iran, and they are worrying. And it is one of the things that the

international community, including the United States, would like

to have the Iranians clear up as we work our way through a negotiating

process that should try to end this program.

Would they be redlines? Possibly. But again, it would take a lot

of scientific work and some real care, in effect, to understand what

those were and how and in what way they could be dealt with.

My own view is if that is the case, the first option would be to

deal with them the way we have been dealing with them in Iran

and use our considerable pressure and our growing pressure, in a

sense, to try to get that set of situations explained, stopped if it

continues, we don’t believe it is, and put behind us.

Perhaps I could start? I know the others

will want to comment as well.

My sense is that it is more than just a kind of arguing point. It

is more than chimerical. It is, in fact, serious enough for us, in my

view, even in advance of any such steps, to be taking actions, and

I have welcomed the agreement that we have signed, the 123

agreement with the UAE, which is buying reactors from Korea.

Which agreement, in fact, with the UAE’s full cooperation, is keeping

them away from the sensitive facilities and taking actions that

make sense.

Others may or may not be prepared to come along. In the past,

we have had a history with Turkey on this issue. My feeling is we

have had a history with Egypt on this issue, and we need to find

ways to reinforce the reasons that I think you, with great justifica-

tion, have put forward that might move them in this direction,

including questions of defense and stability.

I think we should give very careful consideration to what additional

assurances we should give those states that do not proliferate

with respect to the threats and dangers that might be

against them beyond what we already have under the Nonproliferation

Treaty.

Whether that is as extensive as Article 5 of NATO or not, I don’t

know. But it would seem to me that it would be in our interest to

do that whether Iran proliferates or not perhaps in terms of building

our relationships and stability in the area. Whether other

nuclear powers ought to also join us in this as a way of providing

a kind of more secure roadblock against disintegration in the area,

I would not foreclose other states in the region.

I would have to be cautious, and we would have to think through

very carefully how this related to Israel, which, as we all know, has

not declared and at the same time is widely assumed to be in that

category. But up until now, and certainly my experience in Israel,

where I lived there for a period of time representing the country,

is that they are not throwing around whatever it is they think—

people think they may have, if I could phrase it that way, in a

threatening way.

And my sense is that we need to look at all of those questions

and options and examine them. I hope they are being looked at because

they can help us provide for more stability and more security

in a region which, at the moment, is being a little more than torn

apart by instability, insecurity. Not just in the country we are talking

about, but elsewhere.